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INTRODUCTION 
The oil shocks of the 1970s propelled the search for alternative 
fuel sources by oil-dependent but petroleum-poor countries. Renewable 
energy programs, energy conservation plans, nuclear power, natural gas, 
and coal projects all flourished. Environmental concerns over air quality 
in large cities, and the significant role motor- vehicle emissions played in 
creating urban air pollution, generated interest in alternative energy. The 
United States and Brazil—then the two largest producers and consumers 
of ethanol in the world—focused intensely on biofuels as a substitute for 
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oil,1 whilst other countries—such as Japan and European Union 
members—focused more on nuclear energy and other methods of power 
generation.2 This state of affairs remained until the 1980s, when oil 
prices dropped significantly, causing a temporary loss of interest in 
petroleum substitutes. However, from the 1980s onward, climate change 
emerged as a significant concern. The 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change3 symbolized the international consensus 
about the need to address climate change, and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol4 
was the first concrete international effort in that direction.5 This new 
focus on climate change revived the discussion about the need for 
alternative energy sources. In addition, during the 2000s, oil prices 
spiked anew; they went from less than US$30 to more than US$70 per 
barrel.6 Political and social instability in areas of oil abundance, 
combined with the widespread belief that oil extraction would peak in 
ten or twenty years and then decline, contributed to this price volatility.7 
 
                                                     
 
1
 See Mark S. Langevin, Renewable Cooperation? Reflections on United States-Brazil 
Cooperation on Biofuels, AM. DIPL. (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/1012/comm/langevin_biofeul.html. 
 
2
 Rogério Cezar de Cerqueira Leite & Manoel Régis L. V. Leal, O biocombustível No Brasil, 78 
NOVOS ESTUDOS - CEBRAP 15 (2007), available at 
http://www.agencia.cnptia.embrapa.br/Repositorio/03_000fxggj1i702wyiv80soht9h0kawrk0.pdf. 
 
3
 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107, 165, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Pt. II)/Add.1, 31I.L.M.849 (1992). 
 
4
 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 37 I.L.M 
22 (1998), Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1.  
 
5
 See Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, UNITED 
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php. 
 
6
 Leite & Leal, supra note 2. 
 
7
 Id.  
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how they apply to the Brazilian model. Part IV analyzes the Brazilian 
experience and explains why it would be very difficult or impossible to 
replicate in the United States. Overall, this article portrays the difficulties 
and challenges the United States will face in trying to follow the 
Brazilian model. 
I. BIOFUELS: NATURE AND ROLE 
Presently, the most commonly used biofuels are biodiesel and 
ethanol. Biodiesel is a renewable fuel produced from agricultural 
resources such as vegetable oils—including soybean, canola, and 
sunflower—as well as recycled cooking oils and animal fats.10 Biodiesel 
can be used in any diesel engine; no adaptations are necessary.11 Ethanol, 
on the other hand, is a renewable fuel made from plants. Ethanol is 
produced by fermenting plant sugars from corn, sugar cane, and other 
starchy agricultural products, as well as cellulosic materials in 
agricultural wastes (e.g., waste woods and corn stalks).12 Ethanol can be 
mixed with gasoline and mass-marketed. Indeed, any gasoline-powered 
engine manufactured after 1980 in the United States can run on a blend 
of 90 percent gasoline and 10 percent ethanol (“E10”). However, only 
flex-fuel vehicles (which are not widely available in the United States) 
can operate with a blend of gasoline containing more than 10 percent 
ethanol.13 In principle, biofuels have a lighter environmental footprint 
than fossil fuels. Plants absorb carbon dioxide from the air as they grow. 
As a result, the carbon dioxide released from biofuel combustion does 
not represent a net addition of greenhouse gases released to the 
atmosphere.14 Biofuels also burn cleaner than fossil fuels because they 
are created from nontoxic and biodegradable substances.15 
Thus, there are both economic and environmental reasons why 
incentivizing the production and consumption of these fuels seem an 
                                                     
 
10
 EPA Technical Highlights: Biofuels, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), at 1, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/renewablefuels/420f10009.pdf.  
 
11
 Biofuels: Ethanol and Biodiesel Explained, supra note 8. 
 
12
 EPA Technical Highlights: Biofuels, supra note 10. 
 
13
 Biofuels: Ethanol and Biodiesel Explained, supra note 8. 
 
14
 ARTHUR RODRIGUES, ETANOL: ASPECTOS JURIDICOS, ECONOMICOS E INTERNACIONAIS 16 
(2011). 
 
15
 See Biodiesel and the Environment, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (March 19, 2012); 
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=biofuel_biodiesel_environment; Ethanol 
and the Environment, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (March 19, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=biofuel_ethanol _environment. 
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appealing policy choice for countries. On the economic front, biofuels 
could potentially diminish dependence on oil imports, offer more 
security in the continuity of oil supply, and improve the balance of 
trade.16 In the environmental realm, biofuels could help minimize air 
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.17 However, as production and 
use of biofuels have mushroomed, the sought-after environmental 
economic benefits have been elusive.18 For example, because planting, 
harvesting, transporting, fertilizing, and converting biomass into fuels 
requires energy (much of which derives from fossil-sources), calculating 
the carbon footprint of biofuels has proven to be a complex endeavor.19 
Indeed, some argue that biofuels offer no improvement at all over fossil 
fuels.20 In addition, burning ethanol may increase airborne concentrations 
of formaldehyde and acetaldehyde into the air, thus increasing local 
pollution and health risks.21 Finally, rising food prices and the 
undesirable expansions of agriculture into conservation areas are possible 
results of the growing pressure to produce ever-increasing volumes of 
biofuels. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHANOL REGULATION IN BRAZIL 
The first official policy adopted by the Brazilian government to 
incentivize the nation’s production and consumption of ethanol was 
Proalcool (National Ethanol Program). It was launched in 1975 by 
Decree n. 76.593, mandating the addition of ethanol to gasoline for use 
in motor vehicles.22 There was no fixed percentage for the blend. Rather, 
Petrobras (Petroleo Brasil S/A)—a federally owned company that held a 
monopoly on oil exploitation, production, refinement, and transportation 
in Brazil until 1997—was directed to buy ethanol and add it to gasoline.23 
The federal government awarded financial incentives to companies 
                                                     
 
16
 Economics of Biofuels, EPA (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/Biofuels.html.  
 
17
 Leite & Leal, supra note 2. 
 
18
 D.A. Walker, Biofuels – For Better or Worse?, 156 ANNALS OF APPLIED BIOLOGY 319 (2010).  
 
19
 RODRIGUES, supra note 14. 
 
20
 Walker, supra note 18, at 319 – 20. 
 
21
 Mark Shwartz, Ethanol Vehicles Pose Significant Risk to Health, New Study Finds, STANFORD 
U. NEWS (Apr. 18, 2007), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2007/april18/ethanol-041807.html. 
  
 
22
 Decreto No. 76.593, de 14 de Novembro de 1975, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: art. 7 
(Braz.). 
 
23
 Lei No. 9.478/97, de 7 de Agosto de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 06.08.1997 
(Braz.).  
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producing ethanol in order to guarantee that ethanol supply would meet 
the demand generated by the program.24 
The Yom Kippur War of 1973 had a devastating impact on oil 
prices.25 The price of oil jumped from US$2 to US$12 per barrel in 
1973,26 causing an international crisis known as the first oil shock.27 The 
crisis deeply affected the Brazilian economy, which at the time imported 
80 percent of its oil.28 The Brazilian government—then a military 
dictatorship29—felt compelled to remedy the country’s widely off-kilter 
balance of trade and help bring inflation under control.30 The government 
was determined to invest in and develop renewable energy sources.31 Of 
the options discussed—diesel oil, coal and ethanol32—ethanol presented 
the most promise and garnered the most support.33 Proalcool was put into 
place by presidential decree in 1975.34 It promised to diminish Brazil’s 
dependence on foreign oil, aid national economic and scientific 
development, and generate employment and income.35 Following the 
creation of Proalcool, ethanol regulation and development in Brazil can 
be divided into four phases.36 
A. FIRST PHASE: 1975–1979 
During the first phase, Brazil’s focus was on producing 
anhydrous ethanol to be blended with gasoline.37 The aim was to reduce 
                                                     
 
24
 Decreto No. 76.593,  de 14 de Novembro de 1975, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: arts. 5,6 
(Braz.).  
 
25
 Ednaldo Michellon et al., Breve Descrição do Proálcool e Perspectivas Futuras para o Etanol 
Produzido no Brasil, XLVI CONGRESSO DA SOCIEDADE BRASILEIRA DE ECONOMIA, 
ADMINISTRAÇÃO E SOCIOLOGIA RURAL (Rio Branco — Acre, Julho 20 – 23, 2008) available at 
http://www.sober.org.br/palestra/9/574.pdf. 
 
26
 Id. 
 
27
 Euclid A. Rose, OPEC’s Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World’s 
Dependence on Oil, 58 THE MIDDLE E. J. 424 (2004).  
 
28
 Pery F. A. Shikida & Carlos José C. Bacha, Evolução da Agroindústria Canavieira Brasileira de 
1975 a 1995, 53 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ECONOMIA, RIO DE JANEIRO 69, 70 (1999).  
 
29
 Brazil was under a military dictatorship from 1964 until 1985, when a peaceful transition was 
made to a civilian democratic government. 
 
30
 Michellon et al., supra note 25. 
 
31
 Id. 
 
32
 Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28. 
 
33
 Michellon et al., supra note 25.  
 
34
 Id. 
 
35
 Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 73. 
 
36
 See Michellon et al., supra note 25. 
 
37
 Id. 
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petroleum imports and, thereby, the ballooning trade deficit.38 Brazil had 
spent US$8.36 billion on oil imports between 1974 and 1976, while 
spending only US$1.4 billion between 1972 and 1974.39 Proalcool’s 
initial goal was to produce 3 billion liters of ethanol by 1980, up from 
less than a billion liters per year in 1975.40 
The government boosted ethanol production by offering loans 
and subsidies to the energy sector.41 It also determined that Petrobras 
would buy a minimum annual volume of ethanol,42 as well as transport, 
distribute, and blend it with gasoline.43 The government would set the 
price of ethanol through the Instituto do Acucar e Alcool (IAA)—an 
agency tasked with regulating the sugar and ethanol sector, defining 
export quotas, and subsidizing the industry.44 Decree n. 80.762/77 
(adopted in 1977) superseded the 1975 Decree and established parity 
between ethanol and sugar prices.45 During the following ten years, 
US$16 billion was invested in genetic research to improve sugar cane 
yield, subsidize the ethanol sector, and underwrite low-interest financing 
for new agricultural machinery.46 
Ethanol production initially occurred in distilleries adjacent to 
working sugar mills.47 This arrangement arose because the sugar industry 
was already well established in Brazil.48 The industry had recently 
modernized and expanded both because of the IAA’s programs, and 
because excess sugar cane was available due to sugar prices decreasing 
internationally.49 
The ethanol era’s first phase ended with this stage of Proalcool’s 
expansion. Growth slowed due to uncertainties caused by fluctuations in 
international sugar prices and the auto industry’s doubts regarding the 
                                                     
 
38
 Id. 
 
39
 Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 70. 
 
40
 RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 16. 
 
41
 Michellon et al., supra note 25. 
 
42
 RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 16. 
 
43
 Michellon et al., supra note 25. 
 
44
 Giuliano Guandalini and Chrystiane Silva, A Dupla Conquista, REVISTA VEJA (Feb. 2006), 
http://veja.abril.com.br/010206/p_090.html.  
 
45
 Decreto No. 80.762/77, de 21 de Novembro de 1977, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: art. 6 
(Braz.).  
 
46
 Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.  
 
47
 Vanessa M. Cordonnier, Ethanol’s Roots: How Brazilian Legislation Created the International 
Ethanol Boom, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 287, 295 (2008). 
 
48
 Id. at 289 (noting that the sugar industry had been well established in Brazil since colonial 
times). 
 
49
 Michellon et al., supra note 25. 
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program’s viability.50 Nevertheless, in 1978, ethanol-fueled automobiles 
debuted.51 Jobs and industry growth soon followed.52 
B. SECOND PHASE: 1979–1986 
In 1979, a new conflict in the Middle East—this time a war 
between Iran and Iraq—contributed to oil prices escalating even further. 
Prices exceeded US$30 a barrel.53 This price spike, known as the second 
oil shock, initiated Proalcool’s second phase. Brazil’s government began 
prioritizing production of hydrated ethanol for consumption due to the 
recent development of motor vehicles fueled exclusively by ethanol.54 
In 1979, the 1977 Decree was superseded by Decree n. 
83.700/79, and major automobile manufacturers signed an agreement 
with the Brazilian government setting massive production goals for 
ethanol-fueled cars.55 Sugar cane production expanded and ethanol began 
to be produced in autonomous distilleries.56 Proalcool’s production goal 
increased to 10.7 billion liters by 1985, up from the 5.5 billion liters 
previously set for 1980.57 
Along with increasing production, the government also 
implemented extraordinary measures to spur the purchase of ethanol-
only vehicles.58 The idea was to overcome consumer reluctance and 
distrust of the new car and fuel.59 A minimum blend of 20 percent 
anhydrous ethanol was set for all gasoline consumed in the country, 
installation of hydrated ethanol pumps in gas stations became 
mandatory,60 taxes on industrialized products and motor vehicles were 
reduced for ethanol-only engines,61 and ethanol-fueled taxis were granted 
a tax exemption.62 Furthermore, the price of ethanol could not exceed 65 
                                                     
 
50
 Id. 
 
51
 Id. 
 
52
 Id. 
 
53
 Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 73. 
 
54
 Id. 
 
55
 Cordonnier, supra note 47, at 298 
 
56
 Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 73. 
 
57
 RODRIGUES supra note 14, at 17. 
 
58
 RODRIGUES supra note 14, at 18. 
 
59
 Cordonnier, supra note 47, at 298. 
 
60
 RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 17. 
 
61
 Imposto sobre Produto Industrializado — IPI (Tax on Industrialized Products) and Taxa 
Rodoviária Única (currently equivalent to IPVA). 
 
62
 Michellon et al., supra note 25. 
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percent of the price of gasoline.63 In 1980, 28.5 percent of all motor 
vehicles sold in Brazil were ethanol-only.64 By 1984, that percentage 
increased to 88.5 percent.65 
This second phase represented the peak of the biofuel program’s 
expansion, as well as the beginning of its downfall. The Brazilian 
government succeeded in establishing ethanol as a viable substitute for 
fossil fuels. Its goals of ethanol production, consumption, and price 
parity with gasoline had all been attained. However, in 1985 oil prices 
stabilized and sugar prices and ethanol prices began to rise.66 As a result, 
the economics of ethanol came into question.67 This resulted in reduced 
investments in Proalcool from 1985 onward. 
C. THIRD PHASE: 1986–2003 
The third phase was marked by crisis. Proalcool’s mandatory and 
subsidized nature guaranteed its initial success, but also condemned the 
program to long-term unsustainability.68 In 1985, the military dictatorship 
ended. The subsequent transition to democracy saw the government 
begin to prioritize the need to control inflation and equalize the balance 
of trade.69 In 1986, international oil prices decreased and stabilized, and 
Brazil’s dependence on foreign oil decreased as the country began 
relying more on domestic petroleum supplies.70 As a result, incentives to 
expand ethanol production were cut and the government reduced 
subsidies to existing ethanol plants.71 
The decrease in federal support for ethanol revealed a dangerous 
imbalance in the supply of and demand for the biofuel.72 The program 
became discredited while high international sugar prices and lower 
government incentives spurred the ethanol industry to turn to sugar 
production.73 However, tax incentives for ethanol-fueled vehicles 
                                                     
 
63
 Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 75. 
 
64
 Id. at 80 
 
65
 Id. 
 
66
 RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 17. 
 
67
 Id. 
 
68
 Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44.  
 
69
 Michellon et al., supra note 25. 
 
70
 Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44. 
 
71
 Id. 
 
72
 Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 80. 
 
73
 Michellon et al., supra note 25. 
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remained and ethanol prices dropped lower than gasoline prices.74 Thus, 
even though production stagnated, ethanol consumption continued to 
increase.75 By 1986, the volumes of ethanol and gasoline consumed in 
Brazil were practically the same,76 and 90 percent of vehicles traded were 
ethanol-only.77 This led to a critical crisis in supply. In 1989, Brazil 
began importing ethanol.78 
In 1990, the ethanol sector was deregulated and the once 
powerful IAA was extinguished.79 By 1994, only 12.2 percent of motor 
vehicles sold in Brazil were ethanol-only.80 This downturn reflected a 
lack of consumer confidence, which in turn stemmed from hardships 
faced by owners of ethanol-only vehicles during the supply crisis.81 In 
1998, ethanol-only vehicle production was discontinued.82 
Despite the halt in production, the legislature enacted an 
important pro-ethanol law.83 Law n. 8.723/93 mandated reductions in 
pollutants emitted by motor vehicles and established a mandatory blend 
of 22 percent ethanol for all gasoline sold in Brazil.84 This represented an 
important shift in the federal ethanol policy. For the first time, ethanol 
production was incentivized for environmental rather than economic 
reasons.85 This new law determining the mandatory blend was the main 
reason why ethanol production continued in Brazil during the 1990s.86 
Financial difficulties and the failure of governmental policies 
during the 1990s resulted in the end of subsidies and government 
incentives as well as the private sector’s efforts to revitalize and adapt 
the industry to the new economic reality.87 The industry had to be 
                                                     
 
74
 Id. 
 
75
 Id. 
 
76
 Id. 
 
77
 RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 17. 
 
78
 Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 79. 
 
79
 Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44. 
 
80
 Shikida & Bacha, supra note 28, at 80. 
 
81
 André Tosi Furtado & Mirna Ivone Gaya Scandiffio, A Promessa do Etanol no Brasil, VISAGES 
D’AMÉRIQUE LATINE, no. 5, Sept. 2007, at 95, 97. 
 
82
 RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 17. 
 
83
 Lei No. 8.723/93, de 28 de Outubro de 1993, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: art. 9, de 
29.10.1993 (Braz.) original redaction, before amended by Lei No. 10.203/01. 
 
84
 Id., 
 
85
 HELINI SILVINI FERREIRA & JOSE RUBENS MORATO LEITE, BIOCOMBUSTIVEIS: FONTES DE 
ENERGIA SUSTENTAVEL? CONSIDERACOES JURIDICAS, TECNICAS E ETICAS 126 – 27 (2010).  
 
86
 Id. at 126.  
 
87
 Luis Fernando Paulillo et al., Álcool combustível e biodiesel no Brasil - quo vadis, 45 REV. 
ECON. SOCIOL. RURAL 531,542 (2007). 
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modernized in order to maintain Brazilian ethanol’s competitiveness in 
internal and external markets.88 Agriculture was mechanized, scientists 
experimented with new variations of sugar cane, strategic mergers and 
acquisitions were carried out, and mills and distilleries were 
modernized.89 Many private institutions arose as well. For example, 
Brasil Alcool (BA) and (Bolsa Brasileira de Alcool (BBA), which sought 
to remedy the excess of ethanol in the market and attain better prices for 
the product; while Uniao de Agroindustria Canavierira de Sao Paulo 
(UNICA) and Associacao Paulista da Agronindustria Sucroalcooleira 
(SUCROALCOOL), began to gather and represent a large part of the 
industry in the country.90 
The federal government also created a new agency, Agencia 
Nacional do Petroleo (ANP), in 1997 to regulate and monitor the 
exploitation, production, refinement, transportation, distribution, retail, 
imports, and exports of oil, derivative substances, natural gas, and 
ethanol.91 Finally, in 1999, ethanol prices became subject to free market 
rules and were no longer set by the government.92 
D. FOURTH PHASE: 2003–PRESENT 
After its rise and fall, it seemed like Proalcool and the Brazilian 
ethanol experience had failed. However, a new rise in international oil 
prices, and increasing international awareness about climate change, as 
well as the development of flex-fuel engines in Brazil, gave Brazilian 
ethanol a new push. 93 The spike in oil prices caused by instability in the 
Middle East revived the discussion about fossil fuel substitutes and 
alternative energy sources.94 The 1997 Kyoto Protocol also called 
attention to alternative energy sources, specifically regarding the need to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.95 However, it was the development in 
2003 of a commercially viable flex-fuel engine that could run on 
                                                     
 
88
 Id. at 543 
 
89
 Id. 
 
90
 Michellon et al., supra note 25. 
 
91
 Lei No. 9.478/97, de 6 de Agosto de1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 07.08.1997 
(Braz.).  
 
92
 Ministerio da Fazenda’s Portaria No. 64 (1996).  
 
93
 Guandalini & Silva, supra note 44. 
 
94
 Id. 
 
95
 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4. 
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gasoline, hydrated ethanol, or any blend of gasoline and anhydrous 
ethanol that truly propelled ethanol back into dominance. 96 
The Brazilian flex-fuel engine runs on any combination of 
anhydrous ethanol and gasoline blend, as well as on pure hydrated 
ethanol.97 By contrast, flex-fuel vehicles produced in other countries 
operate on a blend of a maximum of 85 percent ethanol.98 Brazil’s flex 
technology dissipated fears about the unavailability and price of ethanol 
and gave Brazilian drivers the ability to fuel their vehicles with either 
ethanol, gasoline, or both.99 For these reasons, the flex-fuel vehicle was a 
big success, significantly increasing the national demand for ethanol.100 
Flex-fuel vehicles became ubiquitous, with half of the 30,000 gas 
stations in the country offering hydrated ethanol.101 By 2006, seven in 
every ten vehicles sold in Brazil had flex-fuel engines.102 
E. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
At present, there is no legal framework specifically aimed at 
regulating ethanol in Brazil. Production and consumption is governed 
primarily by the National Energy Policy (Law n. 9.478/97), under its 
general regulation of biofuels.103 In the current regulatory landscape, 
Agencia Nacional do Petroleo (“ANP”), the National Petroleum Agency, 
is the main regulatory agency for any activity regarding biofuels.104 The 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Provisions (Ministerio da 
Agricultura, Pecuaria e Abastecimento (“MAPA”), and the Interministry 
Commission of Sugar and Ethanol (Comissao Interministerial do Acucar 
e do Alcool, or “CIMA”) play strategic roles in defining the percentage 
of the mandatory blend of ethanol to gasoline on federal land.105 Tax 
incentives also form an important component of the regulatory 
environment. 
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The National Energy Policy (Law n. 9.478/97) was amended in 
2005 by Law n. 11.097/05 to include biofuels in the national energy 
matrix and to set the increment of biofuels production and use.106 In its 
current form—shaped more recently through amendments introduced by 
Law n. 12.490/11—the National Energy Policy aims to ensure a national 
supply of biofuel, as well as to promote Brazil’s competitiveness in the 
international biofuels market.107 The policy also incentivizes energy 
generation from biomass and residues from biofuel production, 
classifying them as complementary sources to hydroelectric energy.108 
The policy expressly declares biofuels use to be part of the national 
strategy to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, as well as to curb air 
pollution from the transportation and energy sectors.109 
Law n. 11.097/05 changed the ANP’s name from Agencia 
Nacional do Petroleo (National Petroleum Agency) to Agencia Nacional 
do Petroleo, Gas Natural e Biocombustiveis (National Agency of 
Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels).110 Moreover, Law n. 11.909/09 
and Law n. 12.490/11 added the regulation, authorization, and operative 
oversight of any activity related to the production of biofuels to the 
ANP’s jurisdiction,111 making it the regulatory agency most responsible 
for biofuels activities in Brazil. 
Law n. 8.723/93, which determined reductions in the amount of 
air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, was amended once more in 
2003.112 Law n. 10.696/03 kept the mandatory percentage of ethanol to be 
blended with gasoline in the national territory at 22 percent but stipulated 
that the president could elevate the percentage to a maximum of 25 
percent or lower it to a minimum of 18 percent.113 In 2001, Presidential 
Decree n. 3.966/01 delegated the power to elevate or lower the 
mandatory percentage of ethanol to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Provisions, following approval of the Inter-ministry 
Commission of Sugar and Ethanol.114 
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In 2007, MAPA Ordinance n. 143/2007 raised the mandatory 
percentage in the blend to 25 percent.115 In 2010, MAPA Ordinance n. 
07/2010 lowered the percentage to 20 percent for ninety days in the 
beginning of 2010.116 Currently, the percentage is 20 percent, per MAPA 
Ordinance n. 678/2011.117 
In addition to the industry advantages created by the mandatory 
blend, there also exist significant tax incentives for ethanol production in 
Brazil.118 While there are four taxes on ethanol, the same four taxes are 
charged on gasoline, but at much higher rates.119 Increasing gasoline 
taxes indirectly incentivizes ethanol consumption and production.120 For 
example, the rate of the Contribution on Intervention in the Economic 
Domain (Contribuicao de Intervencao no Dominio Economico, or 
“CIDE”) on the imports and internal sales of gasoline is R$860 per cubic 
meter, while ethanol imports and internal sales are charged only R$37.20 
per cubic meter.121 Clearly, ethanol users enjoy substantial savings. 
While the government’s principal focus with respect to ethanol 
involves incentivizing and regulating the production of ethanol for motor 
vehicles, production for the energy sector is also implicated.122 Ethanol 
producers may—if all legal requirements are fulfilled—use sugarcane 
residue (bagasse) from their operations to generate energy, a measure 
that is supported by the Incentive Program for Alternative Energy 
Sources (Programa de Incentivo as Fontes Alternativas de Energia 
Eletrica, or “PROINFA”).123 PROINFA was launched in 2002 by Law n. 
                                                     
 
115
 Portaria No. 143/2007/MAPA, Article 1, de 29 de Junho de 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] (Braz.). 
 
116
 Portaria No. 7/2010/MAPA, Article 1, de 12 de Janeiro de 2010, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] (Braz.). 
 
117
 Portaria No. 678/2011/MAPA, de 1 de Setembro de 2011, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] 
(Braz.). 
 
118
 RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 126. 
 
119
 The Contribution on Intervention in the Economic Domain (Contribuicao de Intervencao no 
Dominio Economico - CIDE), the Contribution to Programs of Social Integration and Building 
of Public Servant’s Estate (Programas de Integracao Social e de Formacao do Patrimonio do 
Servidor Publico — PIS/PASEP), the Contribution to the Financing of Social Security 
(Contribuicao para o Financiamento da Seguridade Social — COFINS), and the Tax on the 
Circulation of Goods and Services (Imposto sobre Circulacao de Mercadorias e Servicos — 
ICMS). 
 
120
 RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 126. 
 
121
 Lei No. 10.336/01, de 9 de Dezembro de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]: art. 1, de 
20.12.2001 (Braz.).  
 
122
 RODRIGUES, supra note 14, at 126. 
 
123
 Law No. 10.438/02, de 26 de Abril de 2002, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 29.04.2002 
(Braz.).  
CASSUTO_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2013  8:26 AM 
Vol. 30, No. 3 Brazilian Regulation of Ethanol 491 
10.438/02, and was intended to increase the participation of alternative 
energy sources in the national system of energy production and 
transmission (Sistema Elétrico Interligado Nacional, or “SIN”).124 The 
program was divided into two phases. Phase 1 had an initial goal of 
generating 3,300 megawatts (MW) of energy from those renewable 
sources contemplated by the program (wind, small hydroelectric projects, 
and biomass) by 2008.125 Phase 2 sought to achieve an even more 
ambitious goal: to make possible that in twenty years’ time, 10 percent of 
all energy consumed in the country would derive from projects affiliated 
with PROINFA.126 According to the Brazilian government, Phase 1 was 
implemented successfully, with the generation of 3.299,40 MW of 
energy from alternative sources.127 However, some critics argue that 
Phase 1 was never actually implemented—contracts were signed, but 
many projects did not generate energy due to various problems.128 Phase 
2 seems to have been abandoned, with no apparent effort or planning 
from the government for its realization.129 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
Ethanol development has helped Brazil overcome a historical 
dependency on foreign oil, allowing it to completely cease oil imports.130 
This wholesale integration of ethanol has enabled the most successful 
alternative to fossil fuels for transportation currently known.131 The 
initiative is also an important part of a national effort to curtail 
greenhouse gas emissions and diminish air pollution from motor 
vehicles. 
Ethanol supporters maintain that ethanol offers significant 
environmental advantages over fossil fuels.132 They argue that planting 
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sugarcane absorbs carbon dioxide from the air and, as a result, carbon 
dioxide released when ethanol is burned does not contribute to net 
greenhouse gas emissions.133 They also maintain that ethanol is nontoxic 
and biodegradable and burns cleaner than gasoline,134 thus improving 
local air quality.135 These claims have come under increased scrutiny in 
recent years.136 
Critics argue that large-scale ethanol production raises food 
prices and strains food supplies due to the diversion of agricultural 
resources to produce fuel instead of food.137 They note that the United 
States has experienced higher food prices due to its ramping-up of corn 
ethanol production.138 However, Brazil has produced ethanol (from 
sugar) in gradually increasing volumes for more than thirty-five years 
without experiencing such effect.139 
A possible answer as to why food prices have not risen in Brazil 
is that there are still vast areas available for planting other crops.140 There 
are 355 million hectares in Brazil suitable for agricultural activities.141 Of 
those 355 million hectares, only 90 million are appropriate for planting 
sugarcane, and only 7.2 million hectares are actually under plow.142 Half 
of that total is dedicated to sugar production, not ethanol.143 Thus, 
theoretically there are 77 million hectares available and suitable for 
sugarcane cultivation in Brazil without putting pressure on the spaces 
dedicated to other crops.144 
Another criticism of the ethanol industry is that increased 
demand for ethanol forces farming expansion, which in turn leads to 
conversion of protected areas to agricultural uses.145 This potential poses 
a special concern for Brazil because of the threat of encroachment of 
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sugarcane plantations into the Amazon region.146 However, the threat to 
the Amazon may be overstated.147 The Amazon climate is not ideal for 
sugarcane cultivation.148 Consequently, ethanol production is unlikely to 
expand into the region, particularly with so much other suitable land 
available elsewhere. In addition, technological improvements have 
boosted ethanol productivity.149 
Still, there remains a very real indirect threat to the Amazon. 
Higher demand for ethanol could force people and industries displaced 
by sugar to move to the Amazon.150 This would create the same result 
(increased deforestation) as the expansion of sugar cultivation into the 
region.151 To protect against such eventualities, Brazil has enacted very 
strict limits regarding how much land in the Amazon—and every other 
rural region of the country—can be used for any activity other than 
sustainable management of the native forest or vegetation.152 The Forest 
Code (Law n. 12.651/12) establishes a percentage of native forest or 
vegetation that must be kept in every rural property in the country.153 The 
percentage varies depending on the region and native vegetation. For the 
Amazon, 80 percent of the property must be covered with the native 
forest, and for those in “cerrado”154 areas of the Amazon region, the 
percentage is 35 percent.155 For properties in any other forest or native 
vegetation area in Brazil, 20 percent of the property must be covered 
with native species; and for any other rural property in Brazil, 20 percent 
of the possession must preserve whatever original vegetation exists in the 
area.156 
Consequently, the law restricts the amount of land that can be 
converted to sugarcane or any other crop due to increasing ethanol 
demand. In the Amazon, for example, only 20 percent of any rural 
property can have the original forest suppressed in order to plant 
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sugarcane. 157 However, enforcement of these laws presents significant 
challenges, especially in the Amazon, where the vastness of the area and 
the difficulties of accessing remote areas pose significant obstacles to the 
effectiveness of the Forest Code. 
Thus, although the criticism that a high demand for ethanol will 
force agricultural expansion into protected areas is not wholly accurate in 
the Brazilian case, inadequate enforcement means that threats to 
protected areas by agricultural interests do indeed exist. Ethanol critics 
also argue that using ethanol for transportation may result in more 
greenhouse gas emissions than using oil because more energy from fossil 
fuels gets used in the production and distribution of ethanol than the 
biofuel could actually generate.158 This criticism has substantial merit. 
Depending on the production method and the source plant, greenhouse 
benefits of ethanol vary greatly.159 In the case of Brazilian ethanol, 
however, the balance on a well-to-wheels basis—from the extraction of 
the fuel used in agriculture to combustion in a motor vehicle—is 
positive; it results in significant reductions of greenhouse gas 
emissions.160 Hydrated and anhydrous ethanol consumption by motor 
vehicles in Brazil generated substantially less greenhouse gas emissions 
from the national fleet than if pure gasoline had been the only fuel used. 
For example, from 1990 to 1994, avoided carbon dioxide emissions161 
totaled between 42 percent and 46 percent162 of the potential carbon 
dioxide emissions.163 During the same period, avoided emissions from 
other greenhouse gases were also significant, varying from 6 percent to 
17 percent in comparison with hypothetical emissions.164 These savings 
resulted in substantial part from the fact that most sugarcane mills in the 
                                                     
 
157
 Id. art. 12(I)(a).  
 
158
 Farber, supra note 152, at 385 – 86. 
 
159
 Id. 
 
160
 Id. 
 
161
 The avoided emissions are defined as the difference between the emissions from a hypothetic 
scenario where the national fleet consumes only pure gasoline, and the emissions from the actual 
scenario, where the fleet is formed by vehicles consuming a blend of gasoline and anhydrous 
ethanol as well as hydrated ethanol. MINISTÉRIO DA CIÊNCIA E DA TECNOLOGIA, Primeiro 
Inventário Brasileiro de Emissões Antrópicas de Gases Efeito Estufa — Relatórios de Referência 
— Emissões de Gases de Efeito Estufa por Fontes Móveis, no Setor Energético 39 (2006), 
available at http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0008/8848.pdf (First Brazilian Inventory of 
Anthropic Greenhouse Gases Emissions — Reference Reports — Greenhouse Gases Emissions 
from Mobile Sources of the Energy Sector). 
 
162
 Id. at 40. 
 
163
 The hypothetic emissions are defined as those resulting from a hypothetic scenario where the 
entire national fleet consumed only pure gasoline. Id. at 39. 
 
164
 Id. at 40. 
CASSUTO_FINAL (DO NOT DELET
Vol. 30, No. 3 
country are self-suff
used to generate the e
In 2008, the
greenhouse gases em
plants.166 Sugarcane 
emissions than gasoli
crop residues to gen
comparison, ethanol 
and 50 percent, and 
less emissions.168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
165
 COELHO, supra note 97, a
 
166
 ADRIANO PIRES & RAFAE
FUTURO DA MATRIZ ENE
used in production and di
 
167
 Id. 
 
168
 Id. 
E) 2/12/2013  8:26 AM
Brazilian Regulation of Ethanol 495
icient in energy generation. Sugarcane bagasse is 
nergy necessary to the production process.165 
 OECD issued a study comparing the amount of 
itted during the lifecycle of different biofuel source 
ethanol resulted in an average of 85 percent less 
ne, and even 100 percent in cases where mills used 
erate the electricity to power the operation.167 In 
from wheat provides reductions between 30 percent 
ethanol from corn yields an average of 20 percent 
                   
t 18 
L SCHECHTMAN, ETANOL E BIOELETRICIDADE: A CANA-DE-ACUCAR NO 
RGETICA 196 (2010) ( considering different technologies that can be 
d not consider possible changes in land use). 
 
 
CASSUTO_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2013  8:26 AM 
496 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES? 
The development of ethanol in Brazil has helped the country 
overcome a historical dependence on foreign oil while curbing its 
greenhouse gases emissions and diminishing local air pollution. After the 
supply crisis and the price volatility made ethanol an unreliable choice 
for the Brazilian consumer toward the end of the 1980s and throughout 
the 1990s,169 high international oil prices in the 2000s remade it an 
attractive option once again.170 Perhaps the single most important factor 
in the resurgence of the ethanol sector was the development of flex-fuel 
technology, which permitted Brazilian consumers to fuel their vehicles 
with ethanol or gasoline every time they go to a gas station.171 That 
freedom of choice eased the volatility of the market and provided 
consumers with the certainty that they could always choose the least 
expensive fuel alternative. 
Most of the prevailing critiques of the ethanol sector regarding 
environmental issues do not apply in the Brazilian case, primarily 
because of the peculiarities of sugarcane ethanol production in the 
country.172 The overall success of Brazil’s ethanol program has resulted 
in calls for its replication abroad, including in the United States. 
However, reproducing Brazil’s ethanol success in the United States 
would be virtually impossible. 
First, the Brazilian option to heavily invest in ethanol was made 
during a military dictatorship.173 No dissent was permitted, and 
consequently, prices could be manipulated and a high degree of 
governmental intervention tolerated. Ethanol prices were controlled, 
ethanol pumps were mandatorily installed, Petrobras was obliged to buy 
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a percentage of the production, etc. 174 These measures would not only be 
impossible to implement in a democratic system such as the one in the 
United States, they would also likely fail under the current Brazilian 
democratic regime. 
Second, the United States lacks the infrastructure and the market 
for widespread ethanol consumption in motor vehicles. The facts that 
most gas stations in Brazil have pumps for hydrated ethanol and that 
most people own flex-fuel vehicles are key to the success of Brazilian 
ethanol.175 In the United States, gas stations would likely be very 
reluctant to install hydrated ethanol pumps until demand existed. 
Consumers, on the other hand, would be deterred from investing in flex-
fuel vehicles until there was infrastructure in place with which to 
purchase flex fuel. The ensuing stalemate creates an environment where 
the rapid growth of a flex fuel vehicle market becomes highly unlikely. 
Third, and most importantly, Brazil produces ethanol from 
sugarcane, while the United States produces ethanol from corn.176 
Ethanol from sugarcane is cheaper and more energy efficient than corn 
ethanol, and its mass production does not cause the same impact on food 
markets in Brazil as ethanol from corn did and does in the United 
States.177 
Corn ethanol is also more expensive to produce than both 
gasoline and Brazilian sugarcane ethanol.178 The low cost of sugarcane 
ethanol production allows Brazilian ethanol to compete with gasoline 
without the substantial subsidies used until recently179 by the United 
States to make corn ethanol competitive.180 
Corn ethanol production is also energy-intensive.181It may 
require more energy to produce and distribute then it is capable of 
generating.182 This significantly diminishes the possible greenhouse gas 
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emissions benefits.183 By contrast, sugarcane ethanol results in an average 
of 85 percent less emissions than gasoline, and can reach 100 percent in 
cases where mills are energy self-sufficient.184 Furthermore, corn is a 
“major food crop” and livestock food,185 and most usable farmland in the 
United States is already in production.186 Consequently, any substantial 
diversion of corn to ethanol production will almost certainly affect food 
prices.187 Brazil, on the other hand, has vast lands available and suitable 
for planting sugarcane without displacing other crops. For all of these 
reasons, if the United States were to pursue ethanol as a substitute for 
gasoline on the same scale as Brazil did, and if it were to do so with an 
eye toward real environmental gains and minimizing impacts on the food 
supply, it would have to seek source plants other than corn. 
There are other alternative feed sources for ethanol under 
study.188 The most promising of these is cellulosic ethanol.189 Cellulosic 
ethanol is produced by breaking down cellulose in woody fibers such as 
trees, grasses, and crop wastes.190 These sources require less energy, 
fertilizer, water, and can also be cultivated on lands not appropriate for 
growing food.191 However none of these cellulosic ethanol alternatives 
are yet commercially viable.192 
In sum, the hard lesson for the United States to learn from the 
Brazilian model is that while the results are worthy of emulation, the 
methods of achieving it were unique. Thus, the methods used in Brazil 
are not necessarily desirable and the results are simply not replicable 
here. 
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